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“They Say They’re Not Here to Protect Us.” Civilian perspectives on the African Union Mission in Somalia

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Report from
International Refugee Rights Initiative

This report explores some of the key challenges facing the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from the perspective of civilians living in the midst of the conflict. Based on interviews with 64 Somali citizens, it shows that many people in Somalia hold views that are critical towards the peacekeeping mission.

The majority of interviewees expressed their discontent with the results achieved by AMISOM, especially its failure to protect civilians against attacks by Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. Its limited results were contrasted with its decade-long presence in the country. AMISOM was created in 2007, and gradually developed into a force with a maximum of 22,126 troops, mandated primarily to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and to provide security to government institutions and humanitarian actors.

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Other citizens acknowledged the positive achievements by the mission and the difficult context in which it has to carry out its mandate. While large swathes of the territory are still vulnerable to attacks by Al-Shabaab and other violence, important security gains have been made. Over the years, AMISOM troops have made serious sacrifices.

Many people interviewed by IRRI said there was a clear lack of understanding among Somalis as to AMISOM’s mandate. While most knew that AMISOM is tasked to conduct offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and to protect government institutions, other aspects of the mandate were far less known. This lack of proper understanding of the mandate contributed to severe criticism by some, especially those living in areas with high levels of insecurity.

Several respondents told IRRI that they felt the mission had been unable to provide protection of civilians, which, although not part of their mandate, is a matter of concern for the mission.
Interviewees also expressed general distrust of the foreign presence that AMISOM represents, but specifically highlighted concerns with several national contingents, in particular Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have a history of unilateral intervention and difficult civil-military relations in Somalia. Other contingents, such as those from Djibouti, were much better regarded, mainly because of their efforts to build community relations and provide services to nearby communities.
While interviewees held the opinion that the Somali security services are better placed than AMISOM to provide security, they also acknowledged that they lack sufficient capacity and inclusivity. Views on AMISOM’s exit differed.

AMISOM is mandated to enable the handing over of responsibilities to the national security services, and to conduct joint operations with the Somali military. Supporting the development of the Somali security sector was seen as a key activity for international and regional actors, and a precondition for troop reduction or the mission’s withdrawal. The AU has announced that the withdrawal of forces will begin in 2018. However, given that troop-contributing countries have announced their intention to start pulling out even sooner, it is vital that the AU, UN and donors increase their efforts in the field of security sector development. During a conference in London in May 2017, the Somali government and its international partners confirmed the intention to start withdrawing AMISOM troops in 2018, and to step up efforts by the government and its partners to strengthen the Somali security services.

A common observation was that AMISOM fails to sustain its gains against Al-Shabaab. Inhabitants of the city of Marka, for example, complained about the lack of follow-up when their town was taken over by AMISOM. The poorly trained and equipped national security forces could not defend the town, and it therefore shifted hands multiple times between Al-Shabaab and AMISOM/government forces, accompanied by reprisals by Al-Shabaab against civilians accused of collaborating with the latter.

Finally, many interviewees testified about abuses committed by AMISOM forces, including sexual violence, arbitrary detention, incidents leading to the deaths of civilians and the discrimination against Somalis working for the mission.

IRRI was unable to independently verify most of those allegations, but observed a strong deterioration of the perception of the mission by victims of abuses or their families. This was further reinforced by a perception that no credible investigations had taken place and that no perpetrators had been brought to justice. While several mechanisms were set up to deal with such abuses, it seems that there was a lack of awareness of these mechanisms among those affected.
International Refugees Rights Initiative requested a meeting and sent a letter with a summary of its findings to AMISOM, but received no response.

In sum, the findings make it clear that AMISOM needs to address the commonly held perception that it is unable to protect civilians and ensure more effective communication with the local population about the mission’s mandate, activities and exit strategy. The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council should strengthen the mission’s mandate on civilian protection and build on the London conference to work with the Somali authorities and donors on effective security sector development and with troop-contributing countries on their bilateral activities and accountability for abuses by their troops.

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FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY OR LOCAL EXPERTISE? AL-SHABAAB’S IED CAPABILITY

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Author(s): Daisy Muibu and Benjamin Nickels

Abstract: Al-Shabaab has become one of Africa’s deadliest terrorist groups in recent years through its use of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Technological sophistication from abroad, especially from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, may explain some exceptional recent attacks. However, al-Shabaab’s purge of external influences, reliance on local materials, and refinement of bomb deployment all indicate the importance of local expertise in its current IED campaign. Responses focused primarily on breaking international ties or taking out tech-savvy foreign-born or foreign-trained bomb makers are therefore unlikely to be sufficient or to succeed.

On October 14, 2017, Somalia suffered its largest terrorist attack in decades when two truck bombs exploded in the capital city,1 killing at least 350 people and wounding hundreds more.2 While unclaimed, it is likely the work of al-Shabaab, and the attack—the 33rd car bombing in Mogadishu in 20173—highlights the terrorist group’s increasing explosives capabilities. Al-Shabaab has become one of Africa’s deadliest terrorist groups primarily through a precipitous increase in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Al-Shabaab’s record 395 IED attacks in Somalia in 2016—almost 11 times the number in 2010 and nearly a 50-percent increase over 2015—more than doubled IED-related injuries and more than tripled IED-related deaths over the previous year, according to a recent study by Sahan Research.a Al-Shabaab also managed to carry out only the third recorded suicide terrorist attack on a commercial passenger flight, bombing a Daallo Airlines flight in February 2016 with an IED sophisticatedly disguised as a laptop.

The rise of al-Shabaab’s IED attacks is often seen as the result of a technology upgrade going hand-in-hand with the organization’s growing international connections. Emerging from the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) around 2006, al-Shabaab progressively affiliated with al-Qa`ida and conducted attacks abroad against targets in Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda. Today, al-Shabaab’s ties to al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in Yemen remain the most consequential of its international links. Yemen, long a source of fighters for al-Shabaab,4 has become a source for IED detonators and detonating cords.5 Moreover, the analyst Kathleen Zimmerman stated in U.S. congressional testimony that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) “almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise for al-Shabaab’s 2016 laptop bomb” on the Daallo flight.6 The same year, Somali Foreign Minister Abdisalem Omer “cited the use of laptop explosives as well as the ‘sophisticated engineering’ of truck bombs that are now leveling buildings ‘four or five blocks’ from the site of the blast as evidence of heightened collaboration between al-Shabab and AQAP.”7 Furthermore, the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported in October 2016 that al-Shabaab has “used increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive device technology in its operations, facilitated by the continued arrival of foreign trainers, and involving the transfer of knowledge from other conflict areas.”8

But the tendency to understand the growth in al-Shabaab’s lethal IED power primarily or exclusively through new technologies imported through intensifying international contacts is incomplete. This interpretation overlooks important actions taken to limit and reduce foreign influence in recent years. The situation today is unlike a decade ago when foreign influence within al-Shabaab was quite significant. Even before the group emerged, there were reports of the presence of foreign fighters in training camps run by al-Shabaab’s precursor militia in the ICU.9 Early on, veteran al-Qa`ida foreign fighters with experience in Afghanistan occupied key positions within al-Shabaab’s leadership. They were instrumental to the introduction of guerrilla tactics, such as suicide attacks, and they played a major role in training al-Shabaab members in bomb-making and other IED explosives skills.10 Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, an al-Qa`ida East Africa member, trained al-Shabaab fighters in asymmetric tactics, including suicide bombings and advanced explosives.11 Conflict in Somalia drew foreign fighters of diverse backgrounds, skills, and experiences. Al-Shabaab embraced and encouraged their arrival,12 and a sharp increase in IED attacks followed in 2007 and 2008, likely a result of mounting foreign fighter influence.13

However, the foreign influence reached something of an apex around 2010. Counterterrorism pressure intensified, stoking concerns among terrorist operatives about outsiders and spies, and broader disputes within al-Shabaab over strategy, ideology, and leadership came to the fore. Emir Ahmed Abdi Godane eventually moved against challengers and eliminated critics,14 including high-profile foreign fighters. By the end of 2013, through a combination of military action and internal housecleaning, key al-Qa`ida-linked international figures in al-Shabaab—Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Bilal al-Berjawi, Omar Hammami—were dead, leaving the remaining foreign fighters cowed.15 In subsequent years, more attractive theaters for foreign fighters (like Syria) arose, al-Qa`ida may have adopted a less-centralized organizational model,16 and Somalia’s conflict entered a phase of increasingly internal and clan-based dynamics.17 While it continued to integrate foreign fighters, none from the sizeable Kenyan contingent, for example, achieved a top leadership role.18 Today, al-Shabaab occasionally directs some recruits from Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to return to their homes to fight,19 and the group continues to execute foreign fighters on accusations of spying.20 The destructive capacity of al-Shabaab’s IED attacks significantly increased in the same period that there was a purge of foreign fighter influences in the group, suggesting there is more behind this trend than the “continued arrival of foreign trainers” and “transfer of knowledge from other conflict areas.”

Moreover, al-Shabaab operatives do not need to go abroad for basic IED materials, most of which are sourced locally. In addition to unexploded ordnances that litter the country after a quarter century of conflict,21 al-Shabaab gets IED main charges from its enemies in Somalia. According to a recent IED assessment, about 60 percent of the explosives contained in al-Shabaab attacks along the Kenyan border come from counterterrorism forces, obtained either from sub-munitions dropped by Kenyan war planes or through plunder of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).22 Al-Shabaab has successfully overrun several AMISOM forward operating bases (FOBs). At one point, the group attacked three AMISOM FOBs in seven months—Leego in June 2015, Janaale in September 2015, and El-Adde in January 2016—and made off with large quantities of military equipment, weapons, and explosives.23 In January 2017, al-Shabaab once again overran a Kenya Defence Forces FOB at Kolbiyow and claimed to have captured military vehicles and weapons.24

Access to military materials has meant that al-Shabaab most commonly uses military explosives as its IED payload, notably cyclotrimethylene variants such as military-grade RDX.25 When military sources for main charges are unavailable, al-Shabaab substitutes them with TNT harvested from highly explosive artillery shells or anti-tank mines26 or with fertilizer (seized from farmers or purchased at local markets), which is legally imported and widely available in Somalia through aid organizations promoting agriculture.27 Al-Shabaab gets many other IED components locally as well. Motorcycle alarms and mobile phones, commonly used as triggers, are inexpensive and readily available at Mogadishu markets, as are pressure plates mounted on top of a spring—typical triggers for IED landmines.28 None of these components are beyond al-Shabaab’s budget. If early on al-Shabaab relied on financial support from external charities, the diaspora, and Eritrea’s sponsorship,29 the group today is far more self-sufficient, overseeing a remarkably effective ‘taxation’/protection system across south-central Somalia30 and making money off illicit trade in sugar and charcoal,31 as well perhaps as kidnapping for ransom32 and piracy.33 Through seizure and purchase of materiel available in Somalia, al-Shabaab has all the pieces it needs for IEDs.

Finally, al-Shabaab’s IEDs are becoming more deadly and complex, but the growing impact of attacks comes not just from imported technology, but also from innovative deployment. Notwithstanding the U.N. Monitoring Group’s finding that al-Shabaab is using “increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive device technology,” most of the group’s IEDs are not particularly technologically advanced. Setting aside outliers like the Daallo laptop and the recent Mogadishu truck bombings, news reports suggest that when “compared with IEDs found in other parts of the world, the al-Shabaab IEDs are of relatively poor quality and construction.”34 IEDs recovered from Somalia feature crude triggers, such as “pressure plates rigged with metal sheets separated by pieces of paper, pressure plates using saw blades, and bombs rigged with salvaged rocker switches like those found in a house to turn the lights on and off.”35 In fact, the quintessential signature design feature of an al-Shabaab suicide vest includes simple “male-female quick-connect devices such as those used in car stereos, or white plastic rocker switches.”36

The key evolution is that al-Shabaab has become more adept in its deployment of bombs, tailoring its IED attacks through refined tactics, techniques, and procedures. In ambushes of security convoys and patrols along main supply routes, al-Shabaab strategically positions the IED to stop vehicles in a pre-determined ‘kill zone’ exposed to small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. To defend its own camps, al-Shabaab sets out systems of multiple IEDs, either linked together in a daisy chain or detonated separately and arranged for area saturation. Yet another technique involves sending vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) or suicide vehicle-borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) to break through a security perimeter, followed by fighters with small arms and light weapons, sometimes wearing IED suicide vests, to enter the breach and kill large numbers before dying themselves. This IED tactic has been used against FOBs, official buildings and compounds, and hotels and restaurants in Mogadishu and other parts of southern and central Somalia.37

To punish first responders and to inflict maximum damage at soft targets, al-Shabaab has developed still other approaches of deploying secondary IEDs in complex secondary attacks, like those conducted against the Ambassador Hotel and Naaso-Hablood Hotel in Mogadishu in June 2016, where delayed VBIEDs hit first responders as they arrived at the scene after the initial explosion.38 Al-Shabaab has even refined IED tactics to overcome specific AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) countermeasures. In Merca, for example, al-Shabaab set up a double IED trap: a small motorcycle alarm IED served as bait to lure in a bomb unit, while a second, much larger IED lay buried deeper than usual (in order to prevent detection by bomb sniffing dogs) exactly under the spot where the bomb-recovery vehicle would park while disarming the first IED.39

Conclusion
The purge of foreign influence, reliance on local materiel, and sophistication in bomb deployment all point to al-Shabaab’s local IED skills—warranting concern on their own merits. Al-Shabaab’s most sophisticated attacks may indeed rely on new technologies imported from abroad, but it is nonetheless the group’s Somali operatives who establish the makeshift IED factories in abandoned industrial facilities, storage sites, and garages; conceal the bombs in false floors or as cargo in trucks and minivans; distribute IEDs without detection throughout the capital and south-central Somalia; and implement them to deadly effect.40 Responses such as isolating al-Shabaab from AQAP and other external actors and/or applying a ‘find, fix, and finish’ logic to a handful of tech-savvy bomb makers are therefore unlikely to fully resolve Somalia’s new challenge. To the extent that recent IED attacks indicate advancing internal abilities to make, move, and deploy cheap and crude but effective bombs, al-Shabaab will continue to propel Somalia’s conflict forward through its devastating IED campaign. CTC

Daisy Muibu is a Ph.D. student at The School of Public Affairs at American University in Washington, D.C., where she focuses primarily on the Horn of Africa. She holds a master’s degree from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Follow @daisy_muibu

Benjamin P. Nickels is Associate Professor of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where he focuses primarily on the Sahel, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. He holds a doctorate and master’s degree from the University of Chicago.

Substantive Notes
[a] Sahan research materials were provided to the authors in fall 2017. Sahan is a think-tank with offices in Somalia, Kenya, and the United Kingdom focused on security and development in the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the Middle East.

Citations
[1] Hussein Mohamed, Eric Schmitt, and Mohamed Ibrahim, “Mogadishu Truck Bombings are Deadliest Attack in Decades,” New York Times, October 15, 2017.

[2] Abdirahman O. Osman, “The latest number of casualties 642 (358 dead, 228 injured, 56 missing). 122 injured ppl flown to Turkey, Sudan & Kenya,” Twitter, October 20, 2017; Jason Bourke, “Mogadishu truck bomb: 500 casualties in Somalia’s Worst Terrorist Attack,” Guardian, October 16, 2017.

[3] Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Jihadist Hit Mogadishu with Car Bombs, Suicide Assault,” Threat Matrix, A Blog of FFD’s Long War Journal, October 15, 2017.

[4] Sudarsan Raghavan, “Foreign Fighters Gain Influence in Somalia’s Islamist al-Shabab Militia,” Washington Post, June 8, 2010.

[5] Kalume Kazungu, “Shabaab bombs use explosives seized from Kenyan bases, expert says,” Daily Nation, July 1, 2017.

[6] Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda’s Strengthening in the Shadows,” American Enterprise Institute, July 13, 2017, p. 7.

[7] Ty McCormick, “U.S. Attacks Reveal Al-Shabab’s Strength, Not Weakness,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2016.

[8] “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015),” United Nations, October 2016, p. 39.

[9] Roland Marchal, “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 3:3 (2009), p. 389.

[10] Rob Wise, “Al Shabaab,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series: Case Study Number 2 (2011), p. 8.

[11] Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 55.

[12] “JTIC Special Report: Foreign fighters and foreign policy in the Somali jihad,” IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor, Couldson 12:1 (2012), 8; Roland Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al Mujaheddin in Somalia,” SciencesPo/CERI, March 2011, p. 16.

[13] Sudarsan Raghavan, “Foreign Fighters Gain Influence in Somalia’s Islamist al-Shabab Militia,” Washington Post, June 8, 2010.

[14] Matt Bryden, The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), p. 5; “Somalia: Open Letter to Al-Shabaab Leader Reveals – ‘Yes, There Are Problems,” Hiiraan Online, May 1, 2013; Stig Jarle Hansen, “An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabaab’s Internal Divisions,” CTC Sentinel 7:2 (2014), p. 10; Rashid Nuune, “Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab Pledge Allegiance…Again,” Somalia Report, February 9, 2012; Abdulkador Khalif, “Al-Shabaab foreign fighters flee Somalia,” Daily Nation, February 24, 2012; Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab’s Capabilities Post-Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7:2 (2014), p. 5.

[15] Menkhaus, pp. 4-5.

[16] Andrew Byers and Tara Mooney, “Al Qaeda in the age of ISIS,” Hill, July 7, 2017.

[17] Christopher Anzalone, “The Resilience of al-Shabaab,” CTC Sentinel 9:4 (2016), p. 13.

[18] Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 128.

[19] Thomas Joscelyn, “Shabaab spokesman calls on Kenyan jihadists to form an ‘army,’” FDD’s Long War Journal, May 22, 2017.

[20] Dominic Wabala, “Al Shabaab kill Kenyan fighters over spying suspicion,” Standard Media, April 02, 2017.

[21] “UNMAS: Central Mogadishu free from all known unexploded ordnance,” United Nations, April 11, 2014.

[22] Kazungu.

[23] Cyrus Ombati and David Ohitio, “KDF soldiers kill Al Shabaab leader who plotted deadly raid,” Standard Media, January 22, 2016.

[24] “Al-Shabaab attacks Kenyan army base in Somalia,” eNCA, January 27, 2017.

[25] “Feature: IEDS – An indiscriminate killer,” Defence Web, July 28, 2015; Kazungu.

[26] “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009),” United Nations, March 2010, pp. 50-51.

[27] Kazungu.

[28] “Feature: IEDS – An indiscriminate killer.”

[29] Christopher Harnisch, “The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab,” Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute, February 12, 2010; Marchal, “The Rise of a Jihadi Movement,” p. 66.

[30] Tricia Bacon, “This is why al-Shabab won’t be going away anytime soon,” Washington Post, July 6, 2017.

[31] Kevin J. Kelley, “UN: KDF Makes money on illicit charcoal exports from Somalia,” Daily Nation, November 6, 2016; Elsa Buchanan, “UN report finds Kenya still funding al-Shabaab terror group through illegal sugar and charcoal trade,” International Business Times, November 8, 2016.

[32] “Somalia: Al-Shabaab demands ransom for the release of kidnapped aid workers,” Garowe Online, July 16, 2017.

[33] Robyn Kriel and Briana Duggan, “CNN Exclusive: Somali pirate kings are under investigation for helping ISIS and al-Shabaab,” CNN, July 10, 2017; Bacon.

[34] “Feature: IEDS – An indiscriminate killer.”

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Sahan research.

[38] Ibid.

[39] “Feature: IEDS – An indiscriminate killer;” Kazungu.

[40] Sahan research.

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More Phones, More Transfers? – A case study from Save the Children’s Emergency Food Security Program

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Background

Save the Children’s Emergency Food Security and Livelihoods team responds to emergency food crises worldwide, and cash transfers are one of the essential approaches that can be used to help families meet their basic needs before, during, and after a crisis. In 2016-2017, with funding from USAID/FFP, Save the Children implemented a project that targeted 11,074 households (HHs) (66,444 people) in the Bari, Nugaal, and Hiran regions of Somalia with monthly cash transfers for food assistance using mobile money. The purpose of the project is to increase the access to and availability of diversified and nutritious food for households in the region. Building on the project experiences, Save the Children commissioned a study with three leading questions:

To what extent has the mobile money project influenced the use of mobile money among the cash recipients?

What are the key barriers and enabling factors in influencing uptake and use of mobile money services?

What steps can Save the Children take to leverage current projects to expand the use of the e-wallet and other financial services?

Research Methodology A team of two external consultants led the study. The consultants conducted the fieldwork in Puntland (Bari, Nugaal regions) and Hiran; fifteen villages were purposively selected to include some of the most remote communities in the project, with the representation of different livelihood zones. A total of 377 household surveys, 23 Focus Group Discussions, and 35 Key Informant Interviews were conducted. Eight of the villages were observed taking inventory of the services in the villages and the potential for the residents to use mobile money to pay for goods and services.

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Managing the Disruptive Aftermath of Somalia’s Worst Terror Attack

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The 14 October 2017 twin bombings in Mogadishu mark the deadliest attack in Somalia since 2007. As Somalis unite in their disgust at the most likely perpetrator Al-Shabaab, President Farmajo must immediately provide care for victims and use surging support for the government to redouble efforts aimed at overcoming the divisions in Somalia’s society that make Al-Shabaab such a persistent threat.

  • What happened?  On 14 October 2017, twin truck bombings in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, killed upwards of 300 people. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency, was almost certainly behind the attack, but has not claimed responsibility.
  • Why did it happen?  Al-Shabaab has been fighting the government since 2007. The targets of the attack are unclear, though may have been government buildings and the base of African Union forces fighting Al-Shabaab.
  • Why does it matter?  The attacks have united Somalis in disgust at Al-Shabaab and may shore up support for Somali President Farmajo’s government. They also illustrate the challenges he faces: not just Al-Shabaab’s resilience, but chronically weak security forces; escalating friction between the government and federal states, which the Saudi-Qatar spat has worsened; and longstanding clan disputes, all of which Al-Shabaab exploits.
  • What should be done?  The first priority is to care for victims and cope with the attacks’ aftermath. President Farmajo and his government should also improve relations with federal states and address disputes underpinning political infighting. Cleaning up corruption in the security sector and local reconciliation remain priorities.

I.
Overview

The devastating twin truck bombings in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu on Saturday, 14 October 2017, mark the deadliest attack in that country since the current phase of its war began in early 2007. It almost certainly was perpetrated by the Islamist insurgent movement Al-Shabaab, though there has been no claim of responsibility. The death toll most likely will exceed 300, the vast majority ordinary Somalis, including dozens of children, going about their daily business. The immediate priority is to care for victims and deal with the aftermath. Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”, his government and its foreign partners should also redouble efforts to mend the divisions in Somali society and the chronic weaknesses in the security sector that make Al-Shabaab such a persistent threat.

The first and deadliest bomb exploded at the Zoobe Junction in Hodan – a bustling commercial mini-district close to the Red Crescent office and ministries of education and foreign affairs (the foreign minister was grazed by flying glass and debris). Whether the principal targets were the government buildings, as some reports suggest, or a nearby military training camp recently built by the Turkish government, is unclear. A second and smaller blast, that killed twelve, occurred at Ceel Qalow near Halane, the base of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM).

Al-Shabaab, an insurgent group fighting to overthrow the Somali government since 2007, is the only organisation with the capability, motive and experience to pull off anything on this scale. That it has neither denied nor claimed responsibility may reflect its reluctance to take responsibility for an attack that has provoked unprecedented anger and revulsion (it similarly avoided claiming a 2009 attack on a graduation ceremony in Mogadishu) and/or its hope that rumours and conspiracy theories – most peddling the idea of security forces’ collusion – continue to sow confusion.

Despite having suffered military setbacks since 2011 at the hands of AMISOM, Al-Shabaab remains resilient.
Despite having suffered military setbacks since 2011 at the hands of AMISOM, Al-Shabaab remains resilient (see Crisis Group Commentary, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Down but Far from Out”, 27 June 2016). It controls tracts of rural south central Somalia and supply routes between towns, pursues a steady campaign of car bombings, assassinations and other attacks in Mogadishu and has targeted and in some cases overrun isolated AMISOM and Somali army bases.

According to multiple sources, the attack at Zoobe Junction involved an ageing TM (Bedford) truck – a model formerly used by the Somali army and ubiquitous in the country – converted for civilian use as a cargo transporter and packed with explosives. It reportedly originated from the Shabelle Valley and is thought to have passed several checkpoints manned by Somali soldiers on the Afgoye-Mogadishu road. The explosives may have been concealed by cargo, and thus harder to detect without thorough screening or specialised detectors (attempts to introduce sniffer dogs at checkpoints have run aground because many Somalis view the animal as unclean under Islamic law, though such dogs are now used at the airport). It is also plausible that soldiers were bribed to allow the truck through.

Although full responsibility for the horrific attacks lies with their perpetrators, a number of recent trends may have contributed to Al-Shabaab’s ability to mount an operation of this scale and should inform the response of President Farmajo’s government and its foreign partners.

II.
Losing Territory around Mogadishu

Al-Shabaab recently recaptured several areas in the Shabelle Valley, including the town of Bariire, only 45km outside Mogadishu and on a major route to the capital. Those areas fell to the movement after government forces pulled out early this month, in protest that some had not received salaries for three months. Averting attacks in Mogadishu is ever harder when surrounding districts revert back to Al-Shabaab control or when communities, incensed by government corruption and dysfunction or by civilian deaths during counter-terrorism operations, provide the movement tacit backing. Al-Shabaab consistently plays on anger at officials’ graft – Somalia is ranked the world’s most corrupt country by Transparency International – to win support.

The government’s efforts to secure Mogadishu largely involve mopping up illicit weapons, reigning in clan militias and putting up barriers on arterial roads into the city. But these measures are not enough. Corrupt, unpaid soldiers and discontented clans on the city’s peripheries enable Al-Shabaab operatives to infiltrate. The organisation’s elite Amniyat (intelligence) cells for years have been active in the city, penetrating state security structures, gathering intelligence and assassinating government officials and informants.

III.
Infighting among Security Forces

The Somali army and other branches of the security services have been under considerable recent strain. Rising factionalism and clan tensions triggered skirmishes in September, when a Somali army unit and elements of the newly-established Mogadishu Stabilisation Unit engaged in a firefight that left six soldiers dead. Such clashes often involve competition for control of turf, checkpoints and other sources of revenue. They undermine morale and cohesion in the security forces, erode the military’s effectiveness and make it more likely that troops or factions collude with the enemy. The defence and army chiefs recent resignations, as well as the army’s retreat from parts of the Shabelle Valley, may have been related to such problems.

Until the tragic attacks, Mogadishu’s overall security this year had seen gradual if modest improvements. Assassinations and car bombings have been less frequent and deadly than in past years (of which 2016 was the deadliest) and Somali security forces have foiled several attempted vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise attacks. Better training, vehicle checks and patrols on major urban roads have almost certainly helped. But the endemic wrangles between official security forces appear to have allowed insurgents an opening to mount a major attack.

IV.
Political Tensions

Mounting tension between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal states has also impacted security. The rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on one hand, and Qatar on the other, has aggravated such friction. As the Saudis and Emiratis develop direct links with federal states and undermine their relations with the federal government, tensions have grown over which side of the Gulf dispute to back. This also diverts attention from security problems in Mogadishu.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also have stopped direct budgetary support to Somalia, affecting the federal state’s ability to pay soldiers, police and intelligence officials. Saudi Arabia in October agreed to release $50 million to the Somali government, but sources say this is a one-time donation, not a resumption of its previous budgetary support. So long as Mogadishu remains “neutral” – ie, refuses to explicitly back the Saudis and Emiratis in their dispute against Qatar – Riyadh is unlikely to resume its prior assistance. Yet, with Qatar and its ally Turkey also major donors, the Somali government is understandably reluctant to pick sides in this dispute between its partners.

V.
Priorities for the Government

The next weeks will be crucial for President Farmajo’s government. Fury on the street at Al-Shabaab could shore up support for the government and provide momentum for efforts to overcome divisions in Somali society. But there is also a risk that the president’s opponents, especially those in the federal states, could attempt to capitalise on the crisis with the goal of ousting him and his government. Even in the weeks before the attacks, rumours of plans by regional governments to introduce a no-confidence vote in parliament were intensifying. The federal states’ formation of a caucus and issuance of a critical communiqué at the end of an 11 October meeting in Kismayo only deepened speculation. Such upheaval could easily play into the insurgents’ hands.

The government […] should work quickly to improve relations with federal states and address the constitutional questions that lie at the roots of much of the political infighting.
Of course, the government must cope with the aftermath of the attacks and ensure victims receive necessary support. But it also should work quickly to improve relations with federal states and address the constitutional questions that lie at the roots of much of the political infighting, especially those related to resource sharing and devolved powers. The government has invited the federal state presidents to discuss main points of disagreement, including the Gulf crisis, over the coming weeks. This is positive and ought to be supported.

Reforming and cleaning up the security sector is another imperative. Unless the Somali leadership prioritises such efforts, the significant external investment in that sector will fail. Present rates of corruption fuel insecurity. For its part, AMISOM has made significant inroads in reversing Al-Shabaab’s territorial control, but it is overstretched and struggles to fight a non-conventional war against a resilient insurgency that feeds off local conflicts and, frequently, the heavy-handed tactics of its enemies, whether African, Somali or U.S. forces. Somali forces’ inability to secure and govern areas taken, often with heavy losses, by AMISOM saps morale. Partly in an effort to force the government to prioritise security sector reform, some troop contributors now threaten to wind down operations in the next two years. While Somali forces must gradually assume more responsibility, a hasty AMISOM withdrawal would be disastrous, almost certainly ceding larger parts of the country, including main towns, to Al-Shabaab.

Political divisions – between the government and federal states and among clans – pose a grave obstacle to reforms. Redoubling efforts to address such divisions, including through clan-level reconciliation, are critical in themselves but also a prerequisite for security forces’ coherence and motivation. If not built on solid political foundations, training and arming units in the Somali forces could end up aggravating instability.

In this light, a bottom-up, national reconciliation process and political settlements between the government and federal member states, and among those federal states, should be a top priority. Somalia’s key partners, the European Union (EU), UK, U.S. and the African Union (AU) should continue to promote such efforts. In tandem, federal states, supported by Mogadishu, should launch grassroots initiatives to reconcile clans and make local governance more inclusive. Somalia’s Western partners could accompany this process by supporting state administrations to boost their role in intra- and inter-clan reconciliation and help reinforce local security forces.

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