Bartamaha (Nairobi):- A national disgrace — that’s the prevailing impression of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia in 1992-93. The infamous incident involving the Canadian paratroopers who tortured and killed a Somali youth is seared into the national consciousness. Because of this and a few other incidents, the engagement has been called “Canada’s Vietnam.” This, however, is a badly distorted picture. Canada’s Vietnam? Sorry, that’s Kandahar, Afghanistan. Canadian Forces are part of the fight there, and, unless things dramatically improve for NATO, they may be part of the defeat. Victory by force of arms has never looked more unlikely. But success in Afghanistan is still possible if Canada applies the lessons learned during the Somalia deployment. The principal lesson is that third-party interveners must adopt the right stabilization strategy when seeking to patch-up a failed state. The right strategy, used for the first time in recent Canadian memory by Canadian troops in Somalia, emphasizes civilian protection and building constructive relationships with the local people. Of course, this requires a secure environment guaranteed by a balanced combat force used in a firm, timely and measured manner. Serge Labbé, who commanded the Canadian contingent in Somalia as a colonel, and until mid-2008 headed the Strategic Advisory Team in Kabul, called this winning “hearts and minds.” It is a reflection of Canada’s tradition of setting the conditions for sustainable reconstruction and development. The strategy was achieved in Somalia, and Afghanistan is a readily comparable situation. Somalia was not an urban war zone during Canada’s tour. Somalia was, like Afghanistan today, a desert environment, with remote settlements, grinding poverty, fragile stability, and no human security. The Afghans, like the Somalis, want peace, security and jobs. They will co-operate with a force that meets these basic needs. The Somalia mission showed how this can be done in conjunction with the local people. The hearts and minds approach has four components: First, the right attitude. The Canadian military’s approach in Somalia bore all the hallmarks of the compassionate, patient, mediatory style that made them famous worldwide as successful, impartial arbiters. In Somalia, the Canadians demonstrated that combat troops could maintain this attitude in the midst of an internal war, while imposing a secure environment that facilitated delivery of humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. Second, lead from behind. Labbé believed that the local leaders had to be in control and make the key decisions about governance, development and reconstruction. Otherwise, they could become dependent on the foreign troops or unwilling to learn the skills needed to rebuild and peacefully co-exist with fellow Somalis. Putting the Somalis front and centre reinforced the security effort. Without a patient and considerate supporting approach, a proud and strong people like the Somalis could easily have concluded that their country was being altered by foreigners without their consent, and responded violently. Third, we need more than the military. The Canadian troops in Somalia pioneered the 3-D approach (development, diplomacy, defence) to failed-state reconstruction. Labbé’s intent was to convince the Somali leadership to seize the opportunity presented by the intervention to rebuild basic institutions and accelerate recovery. He knew that development and diplomatic support would be required to nudge the Somalis along the proper path. The forth lesson is that rebuilding failed states can be done only at the pace the locals will accept, and this pace will not be quick. Here the Somalia example should be avoided. The hearts and minds strategy was working. Violence was done. Life was returning to normal. A bond of trust had formed between Canadians and Somalis. For example, when a C9 belt-fed machine gun, a very valuable item in Somalia, fell off a Canadian armoured vehicle on night patrol on May 15 1993, it was returned voluntarily when Canada’s commanders so requested of the tribal elders. But Canada and its allies had an operational timetable determined by domestic political concerns. They were not prepared to commit for long and withdrew before the Somalis were ready for peace. In short, while Canadians must never forget the tragic events that occurred in Somalia at the hands of a few, the 3D approach and other invaluable lessons learned must also be recognized. The international goals in Somalia and Afghanistan are similar: to control the territory long enough to establish, not a perfect democracy, but a responsible state entity that can ensure the well-being and safety of its people. The Canadian stabilization strategy was bringing this about in Somalia, and it can work in Afghanistan. There’s still time. Grant Dawson is deputy director of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales. He is the author of Here is Hell: Canada’s Engagement in Somalia (2007). ————– Source:- ottawacitizen

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