Several weeks into its invasion of Somalia, Kenyan forces are preparing to attack the southern port city of Kismayo with the aim of stamping out the Somali terrorist group, al-Shabaab. If they succeed, Operation Linda Nchi will go down in history as having rid East Africa — and the world — of a dangerous menace. However, a prolonged occupation could bring new support for a weakened al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab was reeling even before Kenya’s invasion, having steadily lost the support of the population in areas it controlled. Its strict interpretation of Islam was anathema to Somali culture and its refusal to co-operate with western aid agencies helped to turn a drought into a famine. Refugees had been streaming out of al-Shabaab-controlled territory for months, its leadership was fracturing and the group was forced to completely withdraw from Mogadishu. The same fanatic devotion to a cause that had made its fighters effective insurgents in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia has made them dogmatic, inflexible and ultimately unpopular rulers.

For Kenya to succeed, it must avoid the mistakes Ethiopia made. The Ethiopian campaign was prolonged and heavy-handed, with thousands of civilian deaths. It was also unsuccessful; Ethiopia left the country with al-Shabaab more powerful than in 2006, its ability to resist an unpopular foreign occupier winning it local support and its ability to bleed a US ally winning it the support of al-Qaeda. The relationship between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab grew after 2007 and it enjoys close ties with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

After almost 20 years of persistent anarchy, Somalia boasts a large diaspora around the world. Of particular concern is al-Shabaab’s potential to recruit within it. If Kenya’s invasion turns overly bloody, it risks radicalising its own sizeable Somali population and inadvertently extending al-Shabaab’s ability to carry out transnational terrorist attacks by unifying anger within its Somali population with the largesse of the al-Qaeda franchise.

Since Kenya’s invasion last month, Nairobi has suffered several grenade attacks, apparently carried out by Kenyan members of al-Shabaab. While several attacks do not a movement make, widespread radicalisation of Somali Kenyans presents a serious danger to regional stability. Kenya is a close US ally and a target-rich environment that al-Qaeda has attacked on multiple occasions; if al-Shabaab can provide the personnel to attack Kenya, AQAP will likely provide the funds to do so.

Finally, Kenya’s targeting of Kismayo risks having the unintended effect of forging a dangerous new “alliance of necessity” between criminal and terrorist networks in Somalia. Kismayo serves as a southern hub of Somali piracy; as it falls under al-Shabaab control, the group earns revenue from taxes levied on its pirate gangs. So far, those taxes have been the extent of the relationship between piracy and terrorism in Somalia; al-Shabaab and Somali pirates have different agendas — the former seek to change the status quo, while the latter profit from it. These differences are made worse by regional clan dynamics: a large percentage of the population of Kismayo is from the Majerteyn clan, whereas most of the surrounding area is dominated by the Hawiye clan, whose members compose the majority of al-Shabaab. A poorly executed attack on Kismayo risks pushing these factions closer together. Somali piracy is problematic as a profit-seeking venture, but the convergence of piracy and terrorism is a nightmare scenario.

None of this is inevitable. The Kenyan army is well trained and benefits from close relations with the US. Its goals are admirable and understandable. But any prolonged counter-insurgency campaign in Somalia would be a Herculean task for even the best armed forces. Already there are worrisome signs. Kenya invaded in the middle of the Dayr rainy season, which has washed away roads and slowed down the operations. Such timing raises questions about the overall planning of the campaign. Likewise, the accidental bombing of a famine relief camp was an inauspicious start to aerial operations. To succeed, Kenya will have to eliminate al-Shabaab camps and leadership quickly and withdraw satisfied of al-Shabaab’s inability to regenerate.

Even before Kenya’s gamble, al-Shabaab stood at a precipice; a well- executed campaign could push it over the edge but a bloody and prolonged occupation risks throwing its cause a lifeline.

• Myers is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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