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Opinion

Promoting institutional memory in Somali bureaucracy

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Now that the Council of Ministers has been formally named and publicised after weeks of speculation by Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, it’s time to remind all incoming Minsters of the need to preserve institutional memory after they are hopefully approved by Parliament. In the past it would seem that with all political changes, the organisational change or disruption as it can be best described, followed automatically. This meant a mass overhauling of key staff, priorities and even changes in Ministry names which displaced key experts on certain topics within the civil service.

Each change of Government in the past almost equated metaphorically to a rebirth of the Somali nation because of the lack of continuation, coherence and flip flopping priorities which most new Minister arrived with as if on a personal career enhancement exercise with a few of their own entourage.

Somalia is not a new state and has been independent since 1960. In this time numerous governments, both official and transitional, have created useful and viable policies and laws that have relevance today. These should be examined and modernised where required but most certainly used. Continuation is fundamental to public and investor confidence in any government, especially, one seeking to rebuild after a difficult two decades marred by conflict and poverty because it illustrates coordination, direction and rationality.

Since 2012, when Somalia elected its first internationally recognised government, much time and resources were spent on creating priorities, implementing policies albeit in a disfigured manner at times, and convincing the world that Somalia was moving forward in the right direction. What arguably hampered progress most in the last government’s policy ambitions was the unstable politics which saw three Prime Ministers in 4 years and a similar number of changes in Ministerial portfolios, including Ministry names.

Change in itself is not always negative and the lack of constitutional clarity in the executive powers between the Offices of the President and Prime Minister did not and does not to this day help matters. However, while it is difficult to have any control over the politics, it is easier to manage the bureaucratic processes and ensure the institutional memory required to mitigate the often turbulent and sudden political changes are in place.

The most important factor for institutional memory is the creation and adoption of a long term governmental strategy focused on achieving its national and international policy and political priorities across the board. This is hard to forget if the vision is agreed, clear and its execution effectively delegated to all stakeholders. What President Farmaajo and Prime Minister Khaire must do is agree on their priorities, communicate it effectively and task all their Minister’s and their bureaucrats to execute it. This early and firm agenda setting from the top will limit the Ministerial and bureaucratic flip-flopping and set a goals both must abide by or be held accountable for if and when  it fails.  In any case, there is very little room for Ministerial deviation if well guided because the challenges they are tasked with overcoming have been similar for decades and will remain so for the foreseeable future unless they make genuine headway in addressing them.

A week or so from now, exiting and incoming Minister’s will be signing Ministry’s away to one another and drawing a line under one period and welcoming another in the full glare of the media. However, in the past this process was rushed, defensive and often key misunderstandings led to mass policy overhauls which proved costly. This must be avoided altogether with a different handover process this time round. It is best that incumbent and new Minister’s spend a week together with key Ministry staff discussing past achievements, challenges and possible solutions. This process is less adversarial and more collegiate and is likely to promote continuity rather than the brash dismantling of poorly communicated policies and systems.

Given the importance of institution building across the board in Somalia and the limited funds and time the Government has, institutional memory must be prioritised. Institutions learn, improve and grow but while this process is ongoing the people’s lives do not stop and they need their government to have an impact on their future through public services. It is therefore, important to remember that too many lives were wasted through poor record keeping, egos and the repetitive process of restarting from scratch every time the government changed.

Today, the Government of President Farmaajo is lucky because key documents to guide his government actions are already in place such as the Foreign Policy, Investment Law and National Development Plan among others. However, to drive change forward to achieve his political ambitions of a secure, transparent and economically prosperous Somalia, he and Prime Minister Khaire must champion and oversee the creation of an institutional memory strategy which  ensures all the lessons, successful or otherwise, are documented for scrutiny and further action for Somalia’s development journey.

Information sharing is crucial for institutional memory. It can no longer be acceptable for some Ministers to just work with their own entourage and neglect the Ministry and for senior members of staff or consultants to carry around official policies in their arms rather than sharing it with all the relevant colleagues that are working on the same matter. Institutional memory will ensure greater care will be taken in policy making and implementation processes. It will also stop the often irresponsible telephone based bureaucracy and rash decision making by senior officials and encourage personal and collective responsibility. From this angle, it is clear that a focus on strengthening institutional memory will also lead to greater outcomes for institutional development as a whole in Somalia.

Somali bureaucrats do emphasise the importance documentation and institutional memory. They often speak of the famed Ministry archives which often are piles of paper on top of each other reaching the sky which serves no purpose other than further highlighting disorganisation. To promote institutional memory and personal responsibility it is not always necessary or prudent to sign on a piece paper any longer. It is easier to share, work on together and document things online through secure E-Government platforms. A digital file which many people have worked on together is better to scrutinise, preserve and institutionally rely on for decision making.

Of course, as important as institutional memory is, to achieve the prerequisite bureaucratic competence needed requires the government raises domestic revenues to pay staff properly and on time. Moreover, it is also crucial that the right people are employed with the right motivations within the public services. Ironically, effective institutional memory, supported by E-government, would help to achieve this. The priorities are clear and action must follow.

Liban Obsiye is a senior adviser to the Somali Foreign Minister. Alongside his policy advisory role, he led on the institutional reform of the Ministry for the Minister’s Office from 2014. He can be reached through:

libanbakaa@hotmail.com  & LibanObsiye (twitter).

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KENYA

Bring Kenyan troops home from Somalia

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On January 15, 2016, Kenyans reacted with anger and horror at the news that Al-Shabaab militants had attacked Kenyan troops at a military outpost in El Adde, southern Somalia.

The attackers claimed to have killed dozens of soldiers and captured scores of others, including their commander. To date, the Kenyan military has not released details of the attack, although some reports put the death toll at 100.

The El Adde attack raised serious questions about Kenya’s efforts in Somalia. Why is the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) still in Somalia? What are they trying to accomplish? Why was the outpost vulnerable? When will the troops come home?

The KDF first entered Somalia in 2011 on “Operation Linda Nchi”, aimed at securing the northeastern border with the Horn of Africa nation following a series of attacks on tourists and aid workers.

Until El Adde, things were going well for Kenya, with little violence. The KDF captured Kismayu port, a source of income for Al-Shabaab from charcoal trade and sugar smuggling into Kenya. Ironically, a United Nations report said the KDF was also involved in the illicit trade.

POLITICAL INFIGHTING

But the cost of Kenyan and Amisom efforts is staggering, with a heavy toll of African troops and Somali civilians. Although Amisom has kept a tight lid on its casualties, more than 4,000 soldiers are said to have been killed and thousands more wounded, making it the deadliest peacekeeping mission.

Due to lack of political progress on the ground, even the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts, billions of dollars in foreign aid and 28,000 AU soldiers from 11 countries are unable to impose order in Somalia. The Mogadishu central government is mired in political infighting over the spoils of foreign aid, factions and corruption.

The president of Somalia is holed up in a hilltop palace in the capital city — where a tenuous government exists that is unable to protect its people, administer justice and deliver basic services.

Al-Shabaab also exploits discontent among marginalised clans in the Shabelle River valley, who believe the US-trained, Al-Shabaab-infested, corrupt, one-clan-dominated Somali National Army (SNA) is using the fight against the Al-Shabaab to grab their fertile land. Although they don’t share the militants’ extremist ideology, they see them as defending their lands from State-backed clan militias.

CLAN MILITIA

But southern Somalia’s problems are not limited to Al-Shabaab. There is also small arms in the hands of clan militias and the second-generation of merchants of corruption and violence.

Moreover, the heavy-handed foreign meddling, including self-interested neighbours, impedes creation of a functioning, stable government. In fact, the 2006 US-backed Ethiopian incursion into southern Somalia midwifed the Al-Shabaab.

Then-President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga may have started the Somalia military mission on the wrong foot but President Uhuru Kenyatta has the opportunity to end it well. After all the Kenyan troops are accounted for, he should withdraw the KDF from Somalia in an orderly manner.

ATTACKS

The policy on Somalia is neither protecting the homeland nor serving Kenya’s interest. In fact, it has made border counties more vulnerable to attacks.

There is no compelling reason worth risking more Kenyan lives or treasure in Somalia’s clan-driven terrorism or dictating the political outcomes in the war-torn neighbouring country. It’s time to bring Kenyan troops home and let the Somali fight for their own country and destiny.

Mr Mohamed is founder and editor, Gubanmedia.com, a 24/7 online magazine of news analysis and commentary on the greater Horn of Africa region. aliadm18@gmail.com.

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Opinion

More airstrikes, less aid not enough to secure Somalia

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The end-of-2017 U.S. decision to suspend military aid to the Somali national army until the federal government can demonstrate better accountability and performance of its forces is appropriate.

However, as I saw during my December research in Somalia, even combined with the significant increase in U.S. air strikes against the jihadi group Al Shabab, the U.S. policy is inadequate.

To mitigate terrorism threats and foster stability in the country, the United States must do what the Trump administration explicitly disavows: Focus on internal governance and state-building and insist on far broader accountability of Somalia’s federal and state governments and powerbrokers toward their citizens. Otherwise, the brutal Shabab or its mutation will remain entrenched.

In 2016, Somalia received about $250 million from the international community for its security sector, following years of similar contributions. Yet, its army is not able to engage even in joint patrolling with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, let alone hold territories nominally cleared of al Shabab.

The Somali National Army (SNA) rosters have some 29,000 individuals on its payroll, of which some 12,000 may actually be soldiers with some capacity to fight. The rest are ghost soldiers, widows and the elderly. Despite the massive international aid, the military’s training remains inadequate, and equipment is siphoned off to clans and al Shabab.

Because of theft and corruption, soldiers’ salaries are not paid regularly, though Somalia’s current president Mohamad Abdullaji “Farmajo” Mohamad managed to cut the salary arrears from six months to two. As with many aspects of Somalia’s social and political life, the soldiers’ primary loyalties are not to the state, but to fractious clans.

Somali national security forces do not take the fight to al Shabab; but neither, any longer, does the supposedly 22,000-strong AMISOM. For some two years, it has remained in static positions, often locked-in garrisons.

It too struggles with effectively holding territory, with various clan and warlord militias and semi-official police forces most frequently performing that function. Often they extort local populations, engage in retaliation against rival and minority clans or steal land and other economic resources.

Still, when AMISOM withdraws from territories, as happened in 2017 and with further “conditions-based” withdrawals slated by 2020, security tends to deteriorate significantly and al Shabab fills the void. Its return exacerbates insecurity as the group punishes collaborators with AMISOM and the government.

Although much weaker than in 2012, al Shabab still controls significant territory and regularly conducts attacks in much of the country, including in Mogadishu. The intensified U.S. air strikes on al Shabab’s massing forces and vehicles significantly complicate its operations.

But they mostly disperse the militants, including to Mogadishu, with the same security vacuum left behind. Reliance on flipped and washed-out Shabab commanders, such as Ahmed Madobe in Kismayo and recently Mukhtar Robow and their militias, may bring immediate tactical gains. But if the politics and governance this unleashes remains predatory, discriminatory and capricious, the gains are ephemeral.

Although only numbering between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters, and despite its brutal and unpopular backward version of Islam, al Shabab remains deeply entrenched. Systematically, it outperforms the national government and local powerbrokers in the provision of order and brutal, although not corrupt, justice.

Meanwhile, official Somali political processes and public institutions remain in the pockets of powerful clans, which discriminate against their rivals and advance narrow parochial interests. They are also pervaded by corruption and usurpation of public resources for private gain.

Thus, even Mogadishu residents often prefer to approach al Shabab for the resolution of land and other disputes: Its decisions are widely seen as swift and not corrupt. Using al Shabab-controlled roads is predictable and safe at least for those who don’t collaborate with the government. Buses, taxis and trucks are charged a flat fee upon arriving at a Shabab checkpoint and given a receipt. Their cargo is safe.

Roads controlled by Somali national forces or militias feature many unpredictable fees and robberies are frequent. Thus Somali businessmen, including those based in Mogadishu, often hire al Shabab for security provision for their businesses.

Al Shabab also adroitly exploits widespread clan discrimination, aligning itself with weaker clans and providing them with protection and resource access. Its domestically-oriented recruitment propaganda emphasizes very specific local grievances and cases of power abuse and resource theft, not ideology.

For the United States to robustly weaken al Shabab, it must induce the Somali government to be accountable to the citizens, to deliver public services and to minimize clan discrimination and the exclusion of minority clans.

Priority must be given to reducing corruption in the justice system and in public and commercial contracts and to expanding access to resources for less powerful clans and individuals.

At the end of the day, al Shabab will need to be integrated into Somali society through accountability and reconciliation processes to which the various clan militias and flipped powerbrokers will also need to be subjected.

Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution.

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Opinion

A Trump decree is killing innocent civilians in Somalia

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US President Donald Trump loves signing executive orders. During his first year in office, he has signed dozens of controversial orders on a wide variety of subjects, ranging from national security to trade.

Some of these executive orders, such as the ones on the Muslim travel ban and the Mexican border wall, received a lot of media attention and triggered protests around the world. But many other decisions by the president, causing death and destruction in faraway places like Somalia, went considerably unnoticed.

Only weeks after taking office, Trump signed a directive declaring parts of Somalia an “area of active hostilities”. This declaration relaxed some of the rules aimed at preventing civilian casualties when the US military carries out counterterrorism strikes in Somalia.

The Pentagon claimed that this order expanded its targeting authority “to defeat al-Shabab in Somalia” in partnership with the African Union and Somali forces. But, in practice, what this order did was little more than allow US soldiers to “kill at will” and with impunity within the borders of Somalia.

This is illegal, immoral and counterproductive.

An illegal order
The US aerial bombardment of Somalia started during George Bush’s “war on terror”, but the number of civilian casualties was minimal back then. Since the current US president “relaxed” the rules of engagement, the number and scope of these attacks increased dramatically, leading to many civilian casualties.

According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, there were 32 to 36 reported US drone strikes in Somalia between 2001 and 2016. In 2017, 34 air and drone strikes were carried out, killing more than 200 people.

Al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda-linked militant group, is the official target of most US drone strikes in Somalia. Its ultimate objective is to overthrow the government in Mogadishu and establish a new state in its place. Several African nations have been battling the armed group for over a decade, but Western nations, including the US, are now overtly leading the fight.

In the process, Washington appears to be relying on backdoor dealings and violating the sovereignty of an independent nation. It is not clear who authorises the air and drone strikes the US is conducting.

Somalia is not the “failed state” it once was – it is no longer a playground for uninvited foreigners. Today, there’s an internationally recognised administration in Mogadishu with functioning judicial, legislative and executive branches, and this administration, not Donald Trump, should be the one “authorising” the measures that can be used in the fight against al-Shabab in the country.

Somalia’s constitution clearly states that the country’s sovereignty is inviolable. Its legislative and executive branches are responsible for the security of the nation and only they can decide on military action. Without their approval, attacks are in violation of the nation’s sovereignty and are therefore illegal.

Immoral attacks on innocent civilians
The US cites its national interests and security as a pretext to conduct attacks on alleged al-Shabab bases in Somalia. No one is denying some of those killed as result of these strikes are indeed al-Shabab fighters, but the vast majority of the victims are civilians.

We know this because al-Shabab usually confirms the deaths of its senior commanders and fighters. We have witnessed this when Sheikh Ali Jabal, a senior al-Shabab commander in Somalia, was killed in a US strike in August last year. “The cowardly American enemy planes tried to strike him,” the group said in a statement circulated on social media. “The first missed him and the second hit, making him a martyr.”

Al-Shabab leaders do not try to hide the deaths of the group’s commanders and members, because they know that this would be a hard and futile task. Information about these deaths can easily surface through the clans and communities their fighters hail from.

So, when we see statements by US forces declaring that they killed dozens of “terrorists” in Somalia and hear no confirmation from al-Shabab leadership about these deaths, we question the validity of US claims about the identities of the victims.

Most civilian deaths do not get global attention because the attacks take place in al-Shabab-controlled areas. This makes it impossible for journalists and international human rights groups to investigate.

Sometimes local media publish photos and names of the civilian victims of US attacks. But even this depends on the victim’s clan. If a victim belongs to a minority clan that holds no political power, the government will easily dismiss them as “terrorist sympathisers”.

On August 17, 2017, the US launched three precision air strikes in the southern town of Jilib. US Africa Command released a statement claiming to have “killed terrorists”. However, the victims, seven of them, were civilians from the same family. Photos of their bodies and the remnants of their house were widely published in Somali media. But the victims belonged to a minority clan that has no power and influence in Somalia, and their relatives’ desperate plea for justice perished soon after they buried their loved ones.

A few days later, another US-led military raid took place in Bariire village, 45km from Mogadishu, killing 10 people, including children. Again, the Somali government and the US claimed that they only “killed terrorists”. This time, however, the victims hailed from an influential clan. Survivors and relatives challenged the false official claims about the attack.

To prove their case, family members took an unprecedented step and transported the victims’ bodies to the capital city to put them on display. Due to the pressure, government officials met relevant clan elders, apologised and agreed to pay compensation.

Despite the solid evidence and a confirmation from the Somali government, the US administration still insists that victims of this attack were not civilians. By denying facts, the Trump administration is damaging US reputation as a nation that respects human rights and the rule of law.

A counterproductive campaign
The US military campaign in Somalia will not yield any results.

Bombs dropped from the sky will certainly take out a few al-Shabab commanders; two of their former leaders were already killed by the US. They may also force their operatives into hiding or restrict their movements. But killing a few commanders and fighters isn’t going to bring the demise of the group.

After all, al-Shabab’s success is not based on individuals – it’s based on an ideology and you cannot defeat an ideology with bombs.

Somalis won’t be outraged over the fight against al-Shabab and the killing of the group’s fighters. People in the country understand these men have signed up to kill or be killed.

But the indiscriminate killings of civilians is antagonising Somalis. This gives legitimacy to the militant group as a resistance movement, especially within communities living under its rule. Every innocent person killed by the US is a gain for al-Shabab. Victims’ family members and fellow clansmen will seek retaliation. To them, revenge is an act of justice.

Most of the victims of US military operations in Somalia are farmers and nomads who have no animosity towards the American people. US bombardment is forcing many to flee their homes. In recent months, we have seen “drone refugees” arriving in Mogadishu’s overcrowded camps for the internally displaced. Children are traumatised by the constant fear of bombs falling from the sky.

Mr Trump, your bombs are breeding the next generation of suicide bombers in Somalia. Fight al-Shabab but stop terrorising innocent Somalis. To achieve any success, you must respect international and Somali law, reverse your immoral actions and rethink your strategy in Somalia.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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