STUTTGART, Germany — When former President George W. Bush announced the formation of U.S. Africa Command in 2007, the idea was that it would be a new, friendlier American military face: a combatant command focused more on partnerships than fighting.
“Africa Command is not going to reflect a U.S. intent to engage kinetically in Africa. This is about prevention. This is not about fighting wars,” Theresa Whelan, then-assistant defense secretary for African affairs, said during the command’s October 2007 start-up.
But 10 years later, AFRICOM has turned into something more like a mini-U.S. Central Command than the low-intensity, soft-power oriented Southern Command — the early model for military efforts in Africa.
The flurry of recent high-profile, hard-power measures in parts of Africa, where five servicemembers have been killed in combat in the past six months, raises questions about AFRICOM’s role as the Pentagon’s soft touch.
“I think there are things that have changed in the command, and more importantly there are things that have changed in Africa,” said Joseph Mason, AFRICOM’s command historian, reflecting on how AFRICOM has evolved over 10 years.
During the past year, AFRICOM has launched 500 airstrikes against militants in Libya and conducted more than a dozen precision attacks on extremists in Somalia, where a Navy SEAL was killed in May.
The deaths last week of four U.S. soldiers, ambushed in a sprawling but obscure swath of territory in Niger, highlights how the AFRICOM mission has intensified since the early days.
At the outset, critics and skeptics of the Pentagon’s plan to set up a headquarters solely focused on Africa warned of the dangers of a militarization of foreign policy there. Much of the early concerns, often voiced by officials on the African continent and development organizations, resulted in widespread speculation that the U.S. would move large numbers of troops to the continent to set up a new headquarters.
Compared to other regions, the military footprint in Africa remains hard to quantify because forces rotate in and out of the continent on missions. At any given time, several thousand troops operate in Africa, according to publicly released estimates.
To counter such concerns, U.S. officials during AFRICOM’s early days talked up its unique structure, which includes a staff that is almost half civilian. It also contains numerous slots for officials from other government agencies in the command structure and touts a civilian deputy to the four-star chief.
AFRICOM’s focus on “African solutions to African problems” meant the U.S. was there to help militaries in their quest to professionalize and become more effective in providing security.
“We are not at war in Africa. Nor do we expect to be at war in Africa. Our embassies and AFRICOM will work in concert to keep it that way,” Jendayi Frazer, former assistant secretary of state for Africa, said in 2007.
The effort to soften and almost demilitarize the command’s image was reflected by AFRICOM not using traditional J-code nomenclature, a system that divides command responsibilities using cryptic military acronyms. “I think it was sold that way, and there was a genuineness to that,” Mason said.
While combat operations have surged over the past 12 months, AFRICOM officials still emphasize that the essence of its missions remains unchanged — training local militaries to handle their own security concerns. Most of the original structure is still intact even as AFRICOM adapts to a new threat environment, Mason said.
AFRICOM now conducts scores of annual training events on the continent, which can range from large-scale multinational exercises to small-unit efforts focused on improving tactics. Each year, AFRICOM conducts about 3,500 exercises and training programs, according to AFRICOM boss Gen. Thomas Waldhauser.
Since 2007, “AFRICOM has made great strides … maturing into an organization viewed by many today as ‘value added’ to the challenges we face,” said Waldhauser during a recent speech to Africa policy analysts.
AFRICOM’s focus, he said, continues to be “by, with and through” African partners.
But conditions on the ground have become more fraught in Africa, and U.S. policy has changed in response, showcasing more willingness to take lethal measures as AFRICOM aligns with fragile governments in Libya and Somalia to conduct airstrikes and occasional raids.
In 2014, then-President Barack Obama set up a $5 billion counterterrorism fund for efforts in Africa, which set the groundwork for more robust operations. President Donald Trump has granted expanded authorities to AFRICOM to make decisions on when to conduct strikes in Somalia.
While open talk of combat operations was an institutional taboo at AFRICOM’s outset, AFRICOM now publicizes many of its operations, releasing tallies of strikes.
“The threats have evolved and U.S. government policy has evolved,” Mason said.
A gradual evolution
Around 2010, traditional military J codes were put in place to line up with other combatant commands, a small but notable step as AFRICOM matured.
In 2011, the Arab Spring brought chaos to Libya. AFRICOM conducted its first major combat mission there, leading the initial wave of airstrikes that helped overthrow Moammar Gadhafi. After-action reviews of the operation, however, exposed that AFRICOM wasn’t structured to lead in a crisis. Numerous reforms were made, including the establishment of a new joint operations center at AFRICOM’s Kelley Barracks headquarters in Stuttgart.
Efforts to assemble a more agile headquarters were on display when AFRICOM helped coordinate the U.S. response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Liberia, which involved the mobilization of about 2,800 U.S. troops, Mason said.
In 2012, the death of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, Libya, highlighted other holes in the command, which didn’t have forces in close enough proximity to conduct rescue operations on a diplomatic facility targeted by militants. In response, AFRICOM has set up small outposts scattered around the continent, where troops can be mobilized and rotated during a crisis. Today, there are about a dozen such facilities, including two in Niger, where the U.S. has about 800 troops, according to AFRICOM.
Meanwhile, during the past year, the resurgence of al-Shabab in Somalia and signs of the Islamic State in Libya have been AFRICOM’s primary focus. In Libya, a U.S. air campaign conducted over several months late last year helped local forces push militants out of a key stronghold in Sirte. AFRICOM officials continue to monitor the region and have promised more strikes will be carried out as needed.
“Our mission statement describes our three main tasks: to build defense capabilities, respond to crisis, and deter and defeat transnational threats,” Waldhauser said. “As you might expect, the last of these, to deter and defeat transnational threats, is something we focus a good deal of our attention on.”
Somalia conflict exacting terrible toll on civilians, Al Shabaab responsible for most casualties
SHABAAB Armed conflict in Somalia continues to exact a heavy toll on civilians, damaging infrastructure and livelihoods, displacing millions of people, and impeding access to humanitarian relief for communities in need, a UN report published on Sunday said.
Entitled “Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia,” the report by the UN Human Rights Office and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) covers the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017.
During this period, UNSOM documented a total of 2,078 civilian deaths and 2,507 injuries. More than half the casualties (60 per cent) were attributed to Al Shabaab militants, 13 per cent to clan militias, 11 per cent to State actors, including the army and the police, four per cent to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), and 12 per cent to unidentified or undetermined attackers.
“Ultimately, civilians are paying the price for failure to resolve Somalia’s conflicts through political means,” said the head of UNSOM, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia Michael Keating. “And parties to the conflict are simply not doing enough to shield civilians from the violence. This is shameful.”
Civilians were the victims of unlawful attacks – by being directly targeted and through the use of indiscriminate bomb and suicide attacks – by non-State groups. Such attacks, which are prohibited under international human rights and humanitarian laws, are, in most cases, likely to constitute war crimes, and it is imperative that perpetrators are identified and held accountable, the report says.
The worst incident on a single day was the twin bomb blasts in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, on 14 October, attributed to Al-Shabaab by Somali government officials, in which at least 512 people are officially recorded to have died as of 1 December, along with 357 injured.
“This barbaric act was the deadliest attack with an improved explosive device (IED) in Somalia’s history and surely one of the worst ever on the continent, if not the world,” Special Representative Keating said. “Sadly, its impact will be felt for a long time.”
A significant number of recorded civilian casualties – 251 killed and 343 injured – was attributed to clan militias, in areas where federal or state security forces are largely absent. “The drought has intensified clan conflict due to competition over resources. These conflicts are exploited by anti-government elements to further destabilize areas, diminish prospects for lasting peace and weaken civilian protection,” the report states.
It goes on to note that although the number of casualties attributed to the Somali National Army and Police, as well as AMISOM, was significantly smaller than those attributed to Al Shabaab militants.
“Nevertheless, such casualties are of utmost concern as they undermine the Somali population’s trust in the Government and the international community, which in turn expands the space in which anti-government elements continue to operate,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein.
“While achieving the balance between human rights and security is challenging, the respect of human rights and the protection of civilians are essential as the foundation of a strong, legitimate State that works for the benefit of all its people,” he said.
Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency routinely disregards international human rights law when carrying out arrests and detentions, according to the report, which adds that journalists and people suspected of belonging to Al Shabaab are often detained without charge.
The report flags that information on the conditions of people living under Al Shabaab control is scant. Verifying human rights violations and abuses in those areas remains problematic due to the lack of access and fear of reprisals.
The conflict has disproportionately affected children, exposing them to “grave violations during military operations, including killing, maiming and arrest and detention by Somali security forces,” the report says. In addition, reports of recruitment of children increased sharply. In the first 10 months of 2017, some 3.335 cases of child recruitment were reported – 71.5 per cent attributed to Al Shabaab, 14.6 per cent to clan militia, and 7.4 per cent to the Somali National Army.
In line with international humanitarian law, the primary responsibility for protecting civilians lies with the parties involved in the conflict and the Somali authorities. According to UNSOM, while there have been some positive developments, much remains to be done to achieve an adequate level of protection for civilians.
The UN Mission considers the implementation of an agreement on Somalia’s National Security Architecture – reached by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States in April this year – as central to achieving sustainable security sector reform.
The agreement provides an opportunity to ensure that Somali-led security institutions are accountable and can protect citizens in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, with the continued support of the United Nations and the international community.
Among its recommendations, the report urges parties to the conflict to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian installations by ceasing the use of all IEDs and the firing of mortars, rockets and grenades from and into populated areas. The report also calls for all unlawful armed groups and militia to be disbanded.
In addition, the report encourages AMISOM to strengthen its accountability measures regarding incidents involving civilians, by conducting effective investigations and judicial proceedings concerning serious allegations attributed to AMISOM and other international troops, holding perpetrators accountable and providing adequate assistance and effective remedies for victims.
The report also urges the Federal Government and Federal Member States to adopt the legislative and policy measures, including with respect to law enforcement, to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of serious violations and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian laws, and an effective remedy.
6,000 IS jihadists could return to Africa, AU warns
AFP — Up to 6,000 Africans who fought for the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group in Iraq and Syria could return home, the African Union’s top security official warned Sunday, calling on countries to prepare for the threat.
Smail Chergui, the AU’s commissioner for peace and security, said African nations would need to work closely with each other and share intelligence to counter returning militants.
“There are reports of 6,000 African fighters among the 30,000 foreign elements who joined this terrorist group in the Middle East,” Chergui told a meeting in Algiers, according to the Algeria Press Service news agency.
“The return of these elements to Africa poses a serious threat to our national security and stability and requires specific treatment and intense cooperation between African countries,” he said.
Tens of thousands of foreign fighters joined the Sunni extremist group after it seized vast swathes of Iraq and Syria and declared a caliphate in 2014.
But the group has suffered a host of losses to both its territory and military capabilities in the last year.
Backed by a US-led coalition, Iraqi forces gradually retook control of all territory lost to the jihadists, declaring on Saturday that the country was now liberated from its control.
In Syria, the group faces western-backed Syrian rebels, jihadist rivals and government forces that are supported by Russia and Iran.
But the losses have sparked fears that IS’s remaining foreign fighters may now relocate, bringing their extremist ideology and violence with them.
Pentagon Foresees at Least Two More Years of Combat in Somalia
WASHINGTON — Amid its escalating campaign of drone strikes in Somalia, the Pentagon has presented the White House with an operational plan that envisions at least two more years of combat against Islamist militants there, according to American officials familiar with internal deliberations.
The proposed plan for Somalia would be the first under new rules quietly signed by President Trump in October for counterterrorism operations outside conventional war zones. The American military has carried out about 30 airstrikes in Somalia this year, twice as many as in 2016. Nearly all have come since June, including a Nov. 21 bombing that killed over 100 suspected militants at a Shabab training camp.
In a sign that the Defense Department does not envision a quick end to the deepening war in Somalia against the Shabab and the Islamic State, the proposed plan is said to include an exemption to a rule in Mr. Trump’s guidelines requiring annual vetting by staff from other agencies — including diplomats and intelligence officials — of operational plans for certain countries.
Instead, the Pentagon wants to wait 24 months before reviewing how the Somalia plan is working, according to the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. Moreover, they said, the Defense Department wants to conduct that review internally, without involvement from other agencies — a request that would further a Trump-era pattern of giving the Pentagon greater latitude and autonomy.
Luke Hartig, a senior director for counterterrorism at the White House National Security Council during the Obama administration, said he supported delegating some greater authority to the Pentagon over such matters, but found it “problematic” that the military wanted to be unleashed for so long without broader oversight.
“A ton can happen in 24 months, particularly in the world of counterterrorism and when we’re talking about a volatile situation on the ground, like we have in Somalia with government formation issues and famine issues,” he said. “That’s an eternity.”
The Defense Department has submitted the plan to the National Security Council for approval by other agencies. Representatives for Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and for the council declined to comment on the details, other than to stress that the military took seriously its need to mitigate or prevent killings of civilian bystanders.
“We are not going to broadcast our targeting policies to the terrorists that threaten us, but we will say in general that our counterterrorism policies continue to reflect our values as a nation,” said Marc Raimondi, a National Security Council spokesman. “The United States will continue to take extraordinary care to mitigate civilian casualties, while addressing military necessity in defeating our enemy.”
Approving the plan would also end the special authority that Mr. Trump bestowed on the top State Department official for Somalia to pause the military’s offensive operations in that country if he saw problems emerging, the officials said. The Pentagon has objected to that arrangement as an infringement on the chain of command, the officials said, and the new plan would drop it — further eroding State Department influence in the Trump administration.
Still, eliminating the State Department authority might make little difference in practice, said Joshua A. Geltzer, who was senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. Either way, he said, if the State Department wanted to stop airstrikes in Somalia and the Pentagon wanted to keep going, the dispute would be resolved in a meeting of top leaders convened by Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster.
“The question of whether to allow a veto has been a source of tension before,” Mr. Geltzer said of the State Department authority. “But it’s not clear to me how much it’s worth fighting over — so long as those channels for communicating and working out concerns are functioning.”
According to the officials familiar with it, the Pentagon plan would also exempt operations in Somalia from another default rule in Mr. Trump’s guidelines: that airstrikes be allowed only when officials have determined there is a near certainty that no civilians will be killed. Instead, the officials said, the plan calls for imposing a lower standard: reasonable certainty that no bystanders will die.
However, it is also not clear whether altering that standard would result in any changes on the ground in Somalia. Mr. Trump has already approved declaring much of Somalia an “area of active hostilities,” a designation for places where war zone targeting rules apply, under an Obama-era system for such operations that Mr. Trump has since replaced. That designation exempted targeting decisions in that region from a similar “near-certainty” rule aimed at protecting civilians and instead substituted the looser battlefield standards.
Nevertheless, the head of the United States Africa Command, Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser, decided not to use that added flexibility and instead kept the near-certainty standard in place. His decision stemmed from the challenges of distinguishing fighters from civilians from the air in Somalia, a failed state with complex clan dynamics and where a famine has uprooted people, many of them armed, in search of food and water.
Robyn Mack, a spokeswoman for General Waldhauser, declined to say whether he would again decide to keep the near-certainty standard in place if the Pentagon’s new plan were approved, writing in an email that it would be “inappropriate for Africom to speculate on future policy decisions.”
However, asked whether General Waldhauser is still imposing the near-certainty standard for strikes in Somalia, she invoked his comments at a Pentagon news conference in March, while the White House was still weighing whether to designate Somalia as an active-hostilities zone, saying what he said then “still stands.” General Waldhauser said then that he did not want to turn Somalia into a “free-fire zone,” adding, “We have to make sure that the levels of certainty that have been there previously, those are not changed.”
Ms. Mack wrote that “it is very important for Africom to have a level of certainty that mitigates or eliminates civilian casualties with our strike operations.”
Mr. Trump’s rules, which have been described by officials familiar with them even though the administration has not made them public, are called the “P.S.P.,” for principles, standards and procedures. They removed several limits that President Barack Obama imposed in 2013 on drone strikes and commando raids in places away from the more conventional war zones that the government labels “areas of active hostilities.”
Among other things, Mr. Trump dropped requirements in Mr. Obama’s rules — called the “P.P.G.,” for presidential policy guidance — for interagency vetting before each offensive strike and determinations that each person targeted pose a specific threat to Americans.
Instead, under Mr. Trump’s guidelines, permissible targets include any member of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State or any other terrorist group deemed to fall under the 2001 congressional authorization to use military force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, even if they are mere foot soldiers who pose no specific threat on their own.
Moreover, instead of interagency vetting before each strike, Mr. Trump’s guidelines call for agencies to approve an operational plan for particular countries, after which the military (or the C.I.A., which also operates armed drones in several countries) may carry out strikes without first getting approval from higher-ranking officials.